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Krasovec: Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation?

CYBERSPACE1: THE FINAL FRONTIER, FOR REGULATION?
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for
him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the Internet3 has provided the opportunity for millions of people
from around the world to communicate with each other almost instantaneously. While
this emerging technology is making it easier for people to share ideas, it is also raising
novel legal issues. This new technology will still confront and answer century old
questions concerning governmental interference and regulation of speech and other
communications.
The First Amendment and the fundamental principles of democracy favor the free flow of
ideas.4 The emerging technology of the Internet, with its ability to transmit nearly any
kind of information anywhere, to anyone with a computer and modem, raises the issue
that information should truly be "free flowing" and without restrictions. More
specifically, policy makers continue to debate whether a person using the Internet has the
same First Amendment protections while posting and receiving anonymous messages as
persons who communicate through conventional media. Proponents for anonymity argue
that the First Amendment commands that persons be allowed to share and receive
information that otherwise may be harmful or embarrassing to the sender.5 Conversely,
opponents argue that a person's ability to post anonymous messages on the Internet is
harmful because it allows "cyber-criminals" to shield themselves from accountability and
responsibility in posting illegal or abusive messages.6
This article will discuss the concept of anonymity on the Internet and argue for its
protection. Part II provides background information on the Internet and illustrates the
prominence the Internet has in today's global society.7 Part III discusses the concept of
anonymity and its importance in our daily communications and how these principles
necessarily extend to online communication.8 Part IV outlines the purported justifications
for regulating Internet content,9 which is followed by Part V discussing current and
attempted regulations of the Internet. This article then argues for the full protection of
online anonymous speech as mandated by fundamental principles of "free speech," the
traditions of our right to remain anonymous, and our notions of privacy. Finally, Part VII
concludes by maintaining that self regulation of the Internet is preferable to intrusive
governmental regulation.
II. HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF THE "NET"
The Internet or "Net" is "a loose collection of millions of computers at sites throughout
the world sharing information and files."10 Various computers connect together to create
a system and, in turn, numerous systems form a network.11 Thousands upon thousands of
local networks then connect, with communication software managing the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 31 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 3

communications between them.12 This comes together to form what the everyday
computer-user has come to know as the Internet.
The Internet's humble beginnings trace back to the cold war period of the 1960s.13
Technology was thought to be the key to winning the Cold War and the fields of science
and computers grew dramatically from the perception of fear existing at the time.14 By
the end of the 1960s, the Department of Defense (DOD) created the Advanced Research
Project Agency Network (ARPANET) to connect the DOD's computers.15 Shortly after
ARPANET, the government encouraged the development of other networks mainly from
academic and scientific communities.16 Thus, what started as a research and investigative
tool for the government quickly transformed into a network of networks and the
"Internet" was born.
"To fully appreciate the legal complexities of regulating the Internet, one must first
understand the magnitude of the Internet."17 The Internet is growing at an astounding
rate18 with an estimated 10 percent increase in users every month.19 This translates to
roughly one million new users per month.20 With such an explosive growth rate and
potential,21 the Internet's unregulated and free flowing nature has been compared to the
Wild West.22 The recent attempts of regulation of the Internet have come about largely
because of the previously unrestricted nature of this medium and what some fear as
having a high potential for abuse.23
The Internet is not owned or controlled by any one group or person.24 If the government
were to attempt regulation of the Internet, the FCC would likely be the body to assert
such control, but has yet to indicate any willingness to do so.25 This is probably because
of the inherent difficulty in such a task.26 The reluctance in attempted regulation is due to
the Internet's decentralization.27 The widespread and immediate transfer of information
may make regulation simply unworkable and practically unenforceable.
Despite this decentralization, there is currently some control on the Internet. The most
direct control comes from the Internet Society ("Society").28 This organization is an
international body of volunteers which acts as an advisor regarding emerging issues and
concerns on the Internet.29 As a voluntary, advisory organization the Society cannot
effectively deal with the important legal issues applicable to the Internet.30 Instead, the
Society deals with technical advances and how to ensure continued growth of the
Internet.31 Many members of the Internet community, who are themselves Society
members, may resist any type of self-regulation, fearing that this may be perceived as a
form of self-censorship which is contrary to the basic ideals upon which the Internet was
founded.32 Moreover, many Internet users feel this lack of direct control is the ultimate
value of the Internet and they view it as a pure form of democracy, where people trade
ideas freely and information is equally available to everyone.33
Unfortunately, this free exchange of ideas and information invites those who may want to
take advantage of such access such as computer thieves, terrorists, con artists, pedophiles,
and pornographers.34 Therefore, it may be argued that the new opportunities available to
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the cyber-criminal provide the needed and compelling justifications for regulation of the
Internet, including mandating user identification.35
III. ANONYMITY ON THE INTERNET
The ability to remain anonymous in our everyday life is a valuable and protected
concept.36 Our judicial system has recognized the importance of anonymity in litigation
allowing the use of pseudonyms to shield plaintiff's identities in cases dealing with
sensitive issues.37
Everyone possesses the ability to communicate anonymously in everyday interaction.
People may send mail and make phone calls without revealing their identity, or voice
their opinions in letters to the editors which do not have to be signed.38 This ability to
remain anonymous dictates the way many of us choose to communicate, even if this
influence is indirect or unconscious. While the morality and social significance of
anonymity could be debated endlessly,39 it is useful to examine anonymity's place online
and exactly how it is achieved on the Internet.
In communicating on the Internet, many users subscribe to a Usenet newsgroup.40 Each
Usenet newsgroup hosts an ongoing discussion on a particular subject.41 Once a user has
subscribed to a newsgroup it is possible for that user to post messages to the group and
read messages that other subscribers have posted.42 Ordinarily, when a message is posted
to the Usenet, the e-mail message will have information which allows the Internet to
transfer the message successfully to a particular newsgroup.43 The message will
ordinarily identify the place of origin and the sender.44 Thus, even with the use of a
pseudonym, the message usually contains the e-mail address, making it quite easy to
trace the message back to a particular person or computer. This is mainly a convenience
aspect allowing for easy exchange among group members who engage in regular
conversations. However, the means are now available to ensure greater anonymity on the
Internet.45
One easy way to maintain anonymity is with the use of a pseudonym. This enables the
sender to remain semi-anonymous with the ultimate identity being known only to the
system operator.46 A second and increasingly more popular way to remain anonymous is
through the use of a remailer service.47 A remailer allows the sender to first e-mail
messages to a service provider, thereafter, the remailer strips all identifying information
from the message.48 The message is then sent to its intended destination, with the
recipient being unable to identify from whom or where it came.49
A sender may still be traceable with the use of a single remailer service.50 However, if a
sender utilizes various remailers, sending a single message through a series of remailers,
the sender remains almost completely untraceable.51 Therefore, if the sender is
determined to remain anonymous, he or she has the technology and resources available to
do so. Thus, the remailer serves as a valuable tool to ensure free speech takes place on the
Internet.52
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IV. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGULATING INTERNET CONTENT
The extraordinarily fast development of the Internet is providing vast communication and
commercial opportunities.53 Today, the areas of the law receiving the most attention on
the Internet are intellectual property issues, including trademarks, copyrights, patents,
trade secrets, and licensing.54 Other "traditional" legal issues are also emerging, including
personal jurisdiction issues,55 bank and consumer fraud,56 attorney advertising on the
Internet,57 and a multitude of others issues58 as they intersect with the Internet. While
these issues are legitimate areas for concern, a small group of other crimes have emerged
as the rallying cry for mandatory user identification on the Internet, such as crimes
involving pornography, pedophilia, and hate crimes.59
The major disadvantage or cost to society of online anonymity is its elimination of
accountability. Anonymity becomes a shield for a cyber-criminal to hide behind in
evading detection of immoral or illegal activity.60 In recently discussing the problem with
anonymity Justice Scalia commented, "It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability,
which is ordinarily the very purpose of anonymity."61
Another major disadvantage to online anonymity is the cost of attempted enforcement of
criminal violations of statutes which regulate such anonymous communications on the
Internet.62 This may cause lawmakers to ultimately shift liability and accountability to the
Internet provider or system operator instead of the individual user.63 However, the
ultimate cost would be borne by the entire Internet customer base as system operators
would pass their costs on to customers.64
The ability to easily access and download pornographic images via the Internet has been
used as one of the central arguments in favor of user identification.65 The protection of
society from obscene and indecent material is well established66 and must still be
confronted head-on in the computer medium. This pornography debate will continue to
be a prominent justification for government interference.67 There is a great deal of
pornographic material available on the Internet, as it has been estimated that "more than
eighty-three percent of all images stored in Usenet newsgroups are pornographic and
nearly fifty percent of all downloads from commercial bulletin boards depict child
pornography, incest, torture, or mutilation."68 However, the ability to regulate
pornographic materials on the Internet based on the traditional "community standards"69
analysis may prove unworkable. The Internet has created a "global community," where
the standard of one community may be unacceptable in a constituent community located
thousands of miles away.70
The strongest justification for government interference involving pornography involves
material directed at children. The majority of pornographic material on the Internet is
supposedly available only on adult bulletin boards, which require users to reveal their
identity to providers of such material.71 There is little, if any, debate that child
pornography via the Internet can not be regulated.72 However, the real issue is not
whether such "adult" material may come into the hands of children, because, in fact, it is
documented that children may access such material rather easily.73 The real danger is
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when adult pedophiles deceptively utilize their computers to communicate with children
in public chat rooms,74 which raises the danger of adults luring the children from their
homes into real face-to-face meetings.75 Such fears seem to be more real than imagined,
which provides a significant justification for some sort of regulation to protect children.76
The Internet can also be utilized to advance the ideas of racial or ethnic discrimination
and hate.77 These types of groups now have a global outlet for their rage and hate filled
messages. Further, the Internet can be used on a much more personal and terrifying level
to prey and stalk individuals.78 The online pervert or psychopath has an ultimate weapon
in the form of a personal computer and a phone line to harass or threaten their victims
while remaining safely at home, hiding behind the anonymous protection of the
Internet.79 Therefore, with the increased use of computers and the Internet in the
participation of such crimes, the perception for the need for regulation has also increased
resulting in both state and federal legislation attempting to regulate the Internet. 80
V. CURRENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE INTERNET
A. State Legislation
A few states have recently passed laws which basically prohibit online anonymity.
Connecticut passed a statute which prohibits anyone from addressing another with the
"intent to harass, annoy, or alarm" the other by communicating via a computer
Network.81 However, the Act does not define what is "annoying, harassing, or alarming."
The argument can always be made that any anonymous message is "alarming" depending
on the subject of the message and the sensitivity and discretion of the judge. Thus, the
statute suffers from being overly broad and vague in this respect.
Similarly, a Pennsylvania statute makes it illegal to "program, possess, or use a device
which can be used to conceal or assist another to conceal...the existence or place of origin
or of destination of any telecommunication."82 Also, a Georgia statute makes it unlawful
for any person or organization to "knowingly transmit any data through a computer
network...if such data uses any individual name...to falsely identify the person."83
B. Attempted Federal Regulation
The most chilling example of overbroad regulation to date governing the Internet came
with the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) portions of which, similar
to the state statutes, prohibited anonymous messages intended to annoy or harass the
recipient.84 The constitutionality of the Act was immediately challenged after it was
signed by the president, and portions of the law were eventually declared
unconstitutional.85
The CDA's key provisions were primarily concerned with minors and their access to
"indecent" or "offensive" material. 86 However, a main provision of the Act did directly
prohibit anonymity as well.87 The District Court88 in ACLU v. Reno held that the CDA
was unconstitutional as it violated the First and Fifth Amendments as there is no effective
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way to determine the identity or age of a user who is accessing this type of "indecent" or
"obscene" on-line material.89
Further, the Supreme Court recently upheld the District Court's decision that Congress
did violate the First Amendment with its attempts at Internet Regulation via the CDA,90
as the statute was an attempt to regulate content.91 Justice Stevens writing for the Court
stated:
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires
when a state regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, the CDA effectively supresses a large amount of speech that adults have
a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.92
The Court concluded that such vaugness and sweeping breadth would impermissibly chill
protected speech and that the statute was therefore unconstitutional.93
The District and Supreme Court decisions recognized the value that should be afforded to
online anonymity. The District Court stated "[a]nonymity is important to Internet users
who seek to access sensitive information, such as users of the Critical Path AIDS
Project's Web site, the users, particularly gay youth, of Queer Resources Directory, and
users of Stop Prisoner Rape."94 Such anonymity and lack of direct governmental control
or censorship enhances the value of the Internet as the most effective form of
communication.95
The Supreme Court's decision is a landmark on the emerging intersection between the
Internet and our civil liberties.96 For the first time, the Court emphasized the uniqueness
of the Internet as a distinct medium and signaled how future restrictions of similar
content based on-line communicaitons would be held to the highest level of review.97
Thus, the Court has seemingly clarified its position with respect to the Internet, giving
some concrete positions on how cyberspace will in fact be regulated in the future.98
VI. PROTECTING ONLINE ANONYMOUS SPEECH
A. Fundamental Principles of "Free Speech"
The First Amendment states that, "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right to peacefully assemble, and petition the government
for a redress of grievances."99 Our government, society and every citizen has come to
view these protections as mandating the widest and most far reaching means of
communication possible.100
As the Internet provides for the greatest and quickest dissemination of information ever
imagined,101 this new form of communication must be given the same protections valued
by our founding fathers.102 The Internet, while still in its infancy, stands to be the biggest
tool for changing society and the way we think about virtually every social and political
issue.103 In fact, in recently describing the Internet, Bill Gates, CEO and co-founder of
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Microsoft Corporation, commented, "It's a phenomenon. It's a gold rush. It's a mania. It's
beyond anything I've ever experienced."104 The protections of the First Amendment must
necessarily extend to this revolutionary "phenomenon" in order to ensure every citizen of
his or her individual rights105 and to foster the growth and improvement of our
government and society. 106
Despite the previously mentioned disadvantages of anonymous online communication,
there are also significant advantages, the most obvious being that anonymity tends to
foster increased communication among large audiences.107 Those people seeking
sensitive or potentially embarrassing information can receive such information easily at
little, if any, socially stigmatizing costs.108 Society as a whole may eventually benefit
from the sharing of such delicate information.109 Further, the Internet may serve as a
unique tool in fighting poverty and discrimination by allowing for all segments of society
to have easily obtainable access to the same information.110
More importantly, "the decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire
to preserve as much as one's privacy as possible."111 Those seeking an outlet for
criticizing governments, organizations, or employers, may fear such reprisals and their
voice online may be their only outlet for their concerns.112 In seeking to criticize a
repressive regime or government, many may find online anonymity as one of their most
powerful and effective tools in today's technological age.113
B. Historical Right to Remain Anonymous
While there is no specific enumerated right to anonymity in the Constitution,114 the
Supreme Court has come to recognize it as such a "right" and afford anonymity
protection.115 Moreover, the historical importance anonymity has played in forming our
society illustrates and favors the extension of protecting online anonymity.
The "right" to anonymously voice our opinions and concerns has played a pivotal role in
the formation of our country.116 Virtually every important political actor at this time
shielded himself with anonymity.117 The Supreme Court in Talley v. California118
recognized this importance and historical precedent stating:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role
in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout
history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or
not at all. The obnoxious press licensing law of England, which was also enforced on the
Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the names of printers, writers
and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature critical of the government. The
old seditious libel cases in England show the lengths to which government had to go to
find out who was responsible for books that were obnoxious to the rulers. John Lilburne
was whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to get
evidence to convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in England.
Two puritan ministers, John Perry and John Udal, were sentenced to death on charges
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that they were responsible for writing, printing or publishing books. Before the
Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or
distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by
English-controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were written and
the identity of their author is unknown to this day. Even the Federalist Papers, written in
favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is
plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.119
The more recent United States Supreme Court case of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission120 reinforces the importance anonymous speech has played in our society
and the willingness of the Court to extend its protection. In McIntyre, Margaret McIntyre
distributed leaflets to persons at a public school meeting expressing her opposition to a
school levy.121 Mrs. McIntyre made the leaflets on her home computer and had additional
copies produced by a professional printer.122 She did not personally sign all the leaflets123
and with her son's assistance she placed the leaflets on the windshields of cars in the
school parking lot.124
Mrs. McIntyre was convicted under a Ohio statute which prohibited the distribution of
election literature without the name of the person responsible for its circulation.125 After a
series of appeals up to and including the Ohio Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court reversed her conviction.126
In discussing the importance of anonymity, the Court quoted from the language of Talley
and noted the role of anonymity in the "progress of mankind."127 The Court then went on
to state, "Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.
The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to...expression in order to assure
the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
by the people."128 The McIntyre decision, therefore, strongly reaffirms that anonymous
political speech is protected as a "core" First Amendment right.129
As the Internet has virtually become the modern day version of the printing press in
revolutionizing the ability for the "lone dissenter" to disseminate his or her ideas and
opinions to all segments of society, the McIntyre decision necessarily extends to and
protects online anonymous political speech.130 Furthermore, while the same threat that
anonymous speech protected us from nearly two centuries ago is not as obvious, its
dangers still exist to mandate the protections of such speech today and especially
online.131 It was a mere forty years ago that Senator Joseph McCarthy sought to persecute
communist sympathizers in his attempt to "cleanse America of it's Communist
influence"132 after the end of World War II.133 This "Red Scare" had a profound chilling
impact on society overall134 and only illustrates how quickly governmental power can be
abused. This potential for abuse is even more pervasive today as the government also has
the ability to exploit the recent advancements in information dissemination.
More importantly, while anonymity has historically been framed in terms of political
discussions, "it now appears to encompass most forms of social interactions and relations
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between people."135 Various forms of modern communication and interaction place a
high value on the ability to stay anonymous.136 Thus, the McIntyre decision provides the
groundwork for extending First Amendment protections to online communications which
are not purely "political" in nature.137
The equalizing effect of the Internet allows virtually all segments of society to
communicate with one another.138 With such new found freedoms, the sharing of
instantaneous ideas will contain various viewpoints in a single e-mail message. The
ability of cyber-citizens to communicate in cyber-conversations in real time139 means that
what might begin as a "political" message can easily translate into a "non-political" one,
and vice versa. Therefore, the ability to effectively separate the content of online
messages simply cannot be done. "As a practical matter, therefore, it would be
exceedingly difficult, and probably impossible, to craft a ban on anonymous speech on
the Internet that distinguished between political and non-political speech and yet was
enforceable."140
Any attempted regulation of online anonymity, therefore, becomes an attempted
regulation of content, "since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and
what to leave unsaid."141 Every speaker, even those online, has the right to tailor his or
her views and speech under given circumstances and this, "applies not only to expression
of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would
rather avoid."142 Such a right necessarily encompasses the ability for the speaker to
choose not to reveal his or her identity.143 Selective identity revelation is an important
aspect for many people in communicating.144 If some people are forced into revealing
their identity, they may be effectively forced to not communicate at all.
Thus, the Internet in providing the most sweeping communication revolution ever, could
fall prey to this chilling effect. The exact number of those foregoing online
communication all together could not easily be estimated, but the impact would certainly
be felt. A significant and specific segment of society who value anonymity and feel it is
required for their social interaction with others would essentially be denied basic freedom
of speech rights in this new medium. This effect cannot be justified against the First
Amendment for, "[a] ban on specific group voices on public affairs violates the most
basic guarantee of the First Amendment--that citizens, not the government, control the
content of public discussion."145
In fact, the general nature of justifications for prohibiting anonymity based on offensive,
indecent, or potentially dangerous speech further illustrates the point that any antianonymity regulation is basically content based as the "principal inquiry in determining
content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of agreement or disagreement with the message it conveys."146
The government is concerned with the supposed dangers lurking online.147 However,
such potential danger is not enough to warrant governmental regulation.148 Any attempted
regulation of anonymity will be far too reaching in its scope as there is no concrete harm
to redress. Further, the government cannot effectively differentiate between messages it
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has a right to control149 and those it merely disfavors, such as those criticizing the
government or its officials, those seemingly "indecent" and those simply distasteful or
hateful.150
Those seeking to post such traditional forms of protected core First Amendment speech
will be effectively denied their ability to share their ideas as the cloak of anonymity is
stripped away. It appears the government is simply attempting to promote an interchange
of ideas on the Internet of those it feels are appropriate for this new medium. Such forms
of censorship and regulation cannot be tolerated as we can not allow the government to
prohibit the exchange of ideas simply because some segments of society find the
exchange offensive or alarming.151
Regulation of anonymity would necessarily have to survive a strict scrutiny analysis.152
While the government's contention and argument of protecting the welfare of society and
particularly children from online dangers appears compelling, "It is not enough to show
that the government's ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to
achieve those ends."153 Any attempted ban on anonymity will prove to be too vague154 or
overbroad and it will not help to solve any specific harm in a substantial or direct way,155
and thus cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis.
C. Anonymity and Rights of Association and Assembly
Moreover, besides infringing on traditional free speech rights most associated with the
First Amendment, a ban on online anonymity also infringes on other less obvious First
Amendment and other constitutional rights. 156
When we think of people gathering, we have visions of face to face meetings and
communications such as town meetings or joining a particular group or affiliation which
represents a particular cause we believe in. However, the Internet now allows people to
engage in such meetings, become a member of a virtual community, or join such groups
with such an ease as to facilitate probably more interaction and affiliation than ever
before.157 Nevertheless, the ability to have ones anonymity protected in joining a
particular group or association is an recognized constitutional right and this right must,
therefore, logically be extended online. 158
The landmark decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson159 illustrates the
fundamental protections afforded in the right to assemble or associate. In this case, the
state of Alabama sought to expel the NAACP from the state for its alleged violation of a
statute which required the registration of foreign corporations doing business in the
state.160 The state launched an investigation and the organization responded to a request
in providing records of its activities but not a list of its members.161
The Court reversed a decision holding the NAACP for contempt in not revealing the
membership list noting the importance of the right of privacy and association stating,
"inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
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espouses dissident beliefs."162 The Court has gone on to give such association and
privacy rights extended protection.163 This protection to privacy in association has come
to include a vast array of activities and organizations we may feel are important enough
for our participation.164
The ease of the Internet provides the ability and motivation for people to join a multitude
of organizations they may have otherwise not. The home computer user simply has to
pull-up an organization's home page and begin a dialogue. All the while the identity of
the person is being protected. This ease will facilitate more and more people to join in a
particular association or organization. There is no potential embarrassment or harassment
in participating online, no chance your neighbor will "catch" you coming out of the
group's field office or organizational meeting.
The person who uses their computer to associate with a particular group necessarily is
afforded those same privacy rights.165 By mandating user identification, there exists the
chance that someone cyber-surfing may stumble upon the individual in an exchange with
the organization. Further, a prohibition on anonymity would infringe on the right's of the
organization itself in not being able to ensure the privacy of its member's identity among
its own members or the public.166
Furthermore, traditional concepts of privacy are also infringed upon with a prohibition of
online anonymity.167 It goes against our basic notions that the government would be able
to reach into our homes and have such a direct and formidable restriction on a method by
which many may choose to communicate.168 By prohibiting anonymity online, the State
is effectively entering our castle169 and telling us we cannot communicate, from the
privacy of our own home, in a way we otherwise are protected in doing.170
SELF-REGULATION AS AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE
TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION
The government's attempt to regulate any aspect of the Internet may be unwarranted. The
Internet has and will continue to regulate itself in a much more productive way than any
broad attempts the legislature may take.171
The ever changing technology on the Internet means traditional concepts of law and
regulation are too static and cannot effectively govern cyberspace.172 Regulations that
have been applied to other forms of mass-media, such as television and radio, may prove
unworkable in the interactive cyberspace world. In those traditional broadcast areas,
regulations have been upheld because of the unique and pervasive characteristics that
television and radio have taken in society and most of our homes in allowing programs to
be accessed by children with great ease.173
These concerns are not present on the Internet.174 This medium, while pervasive in some
regards, is uniquely interactive.175 Users must actively seek out any information they
wish to receive.176 If the government or parents are concerned because of the material
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that may fall into their children's hands, there are existing technologies to block or filter
such materials.177 Parents must take the responsibility and utilize such software to ensure
what materials are being transmitted into their homes.178
For example, most online service providers have developed certain "blocking" software
options179 which allows users to limit exposure to potentially inappropriate, indecent, or
"dangerous" material. In fact, some screening software allows the user to block access to
all Internet sites except for those the parent specifically chooses to make accessible.180
Thus, a parent can institute such precautions and take the responsibility for what material
their child is seeking out and is being transmitted into their home.
Furthermore, if the concern is that anonymity may allow deceptive communications in
the luring of children from their homes, the same accountability concept should
adequately answer such concerns. The parents must take an active role in guiding their
child through the computer revolution.181 An adult's freedom in accessing sensitive or
distasteful information while being protected with anonymity cannot give way to the
paternalistic fears we may have over our children.182
Parents should and must take the appropriate precautions instead of allowing the
government to regulate the Internet. The industry has provided the tools for parents, they
must now implement them.183 "Anything less will reduce the Internet to a playground fit
only for children, transforming the vast library of the Internet into a children's reading
room, whereby only subjects suitable for children could be discussed."184
Moreover, the online community has developed its own "laws" or standards of behavior.
These standards are known as "cyber-etiquette" or "Netiquette."185 Such norms generally
reflect the common real-life community concerns that most are worried about preserving
on the Net. Nevertheless, these norms provide the basic rules on the information highway
and allow members online to effectively punish those who breach the established
norms.186
A recent example illustrates the power that the online cyber-citizens possess. The case
was that of "Mr. Bungle."187 Mr. Bungle was a member of a MUD or multi-user
dimension.188 A MUD is basically a virtual community in cyberspace allowing members
to interact with one another by the sharing of e-mail messages.189
Mr. Bungle committed several disgusting acts of rape and violence against several other
members of this virtual community.190 His actions were so vile, so contradictory to the
common norms of Netiquette, that the vast majority of members in the MUD decided to
"toad" Mr. Bungle.191 This "toading" basically erases the person's account from the
Internet service and he or she is no longer part of this particular cyber-community.192 Mr.
Bungle was banished from this portion of cyberspace by breaching standards established
by other users in the same domain. His story illustrates that the online community is not
wholly unregulated and that it does police itself from those who users feel may pose a
danger to society, even the cyber-society.
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This type of self policing and regulation may prove to be the only workable standards in
this new and revolutionary medium. In fact, recent legislative attempts at regulating some
aspects of the Internet have so far proven to be ineffective and undesirable,193 the most
prominent example of which has been the Communication Decency Act. 194
VIII. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment is the cornerstone of our Independence. Society has come to value
the freedom of speech and expression more than any other of our Constitutional rights.
Thus, the First Amendment and its protections have had to continuously adapt to new and
unique circumstances and technologies in order to secure these ideals. 195
The Internet, as a new and developing technology, tends to scare those who have a
limited understanding of its capabilities and place in society. This feeling of uneasiness
with new forms of communications and expression have in the past been used in attempts
to limit our core First Amendment protections.196 Besides our basic fears and ignorance
of the Internet, there does appear to be some "compelling" justifications for attempted
prohibitions against online anonymity, including pornography, pedophilia, and hate
crimes.197
Online anonymity has been argued as a major cost to society in eliminating
accountability, allowing cyber-criminals to evade law enforcement and responsibilities
for their Internet-crimes.198 Such potential costs and disadvantages do not, however,
provide the compelling justification one must show to survive a strict scrutiny test under
our well-established Constitutional doctrine. The sharing of ideas, sensitive information,
and general public discourse on virtually every social and political issue are all fostered
by the ability of the Internet-user to feel secure, for whatever reason, in not revealing his
or her identity. This is especially true for those who the Internet may be their only way to
gain and share sensitive information regarding such topics as AIDS or child abuse
support groups, or those seeking to criticize their government or employer.
The basic principles of free speech mandate the widest and most far reaching means of
communication possible.199 The Internet's ability to almost instantaneously transmit
information and ideas to millions of people and this Nation's strong reaffirmance in
unrestricted political speech, mandates that our basic First Amendment rights survive
online. "[T]he life of the First Amendment has not been logic, it has been experience."200
Our history and experience tells us that we afford "greater weight to the value of free
speech than to the dangers of its misuse."201 The potential and fear of misuse of the
Internet, cannot justify over-reaching regulations encroaching on basic civil liberties.
JAY KRASOVEC
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1The author has used the generic term "cyberspace" to encompass the use of electronic
communications over computer networks mainly via the Internet. The Internet is only a
small portion of "cyberspace." Anne M. Fulton, Comment, Cyberspace and the Internet:
Who Will Be the Privacy Police?, 3 COMMLAW Conspectus 63, 63 (1995).
Realistically, cyberspace "encompasses all electronic messaging and information systems
including: Bulletin Board Systems . . .; commercial data services; research data networks;
electronic publishing; public and 'private' networks and network nodes; e-mail systems;
data banks with personal medical, credit, membership, purchasing habit, and census
information; electronic data interchange systems; and electronic fund transfer systems."
Id. The term "cyberspace" is originally attributable to the science fiction author William
Gibson in his novel Neuromancer. EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN,
CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ONLINE
WORLD 1 (1994); see also Michael Johns, Comment, The First Amendment and
Cyberspace: Trying to Teach Old Doctrines New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REV 1383, 1383
(1996) (defining cyberspace as the "conceptual space where words, human relationships,
data, wealth, and power are manifested by people using computer technology.") (see also
HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 5 (1993)).
2Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994); see also Associated
Press v. United States 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amendment "rests on
the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 598 (1969) ("If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.").
3"The 'Internet' is a worldwide system of interconnected computers and computer
networks." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., What is the Internet?, in WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT THE INTERNET, at 11, 13 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 443, 1996); see Amy Knoll, Comment, Any
Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275,
277 (1996) (defining the Internet as "a vast web of telecommunication links--a worldwide
web--connecting computers all over the world."); John Zanghi, "Community Standards"
in Cyberspace, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 95, 106 (1995) (stating the Internet comprises
the biggest portion of cyberspace and "[u]ntil something better comes along to replace it,
the Internet is cyberspace.") (quoting Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Special Issue: Welcome to
Cyberspace, TIME, Spring 1995, at 9).
4See Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1639 n.2 (1995) ("[A]ssuring
that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental
purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.")
(quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470 (1994)).
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5See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
7See infra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
10Paul H. Arne, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Developing Law of the Internet, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE: 1995, at 9, 13 (PLI Pat., Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 416, 1995).
11Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of System Operators on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 97 (1996) ("Thousands of local networks connect in a sort of spider's web
in which communication software . . . manages communications between computers. The
user perceives the system to be a unique network: the Internet.").
12The software is called Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). Id.;
see also THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 1996 4 (Alice M. Smith et al. eds., 1995). The
authors note the Internet is the network of networks connected using protocols
standardized by TCP/IPs. "The number of networks linked to the Internet is now in
excess of 45,000 with approximately 5 million host computers connected to these
networks." Id. Network growth is continuing and many countries have numerous
networks linked to the Internet including: Australia (825), Austria (377), Belgium (123),
Brazil (162), Canada (3,295), Chile (86), Czech republic (369), Ecuador (85), Finland
(605), France (1,843), Germany (1,620), Greece (95), Hong Kong (80), Hungary (163),
Indonesia (50), Ireland (167), Israel (195), Italy (478), Japan (1,669), South Korea (449),
Mexico (114), Netherlands (350), New Zealand (354), Norway (211), Peru (116), Poland
(131), Portugal (92), Russian Federate (369), Singapore (101), Slovakia (69), South
Africa (363), Spain (252), Sweden (356), Taiwan (632), Thailand (77), Turkey (90),
Ukraine (52), Untied Kingdom (1,394), United States (26,681). Id. at 26-27, Table 3.1.
13THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 1996, supra note 12, at 10; see also Shea ex rel.
American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing the
development of the Internet and its beginnings as an experimental project of the
Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Administration).
14THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 1996, supra note 12, at 10. "By the late 1960s every
major federally funded research center, including for-profit business and universities, had
a computer facility equipped with the latest technology that America's burgeoning
computer industry could offer." Id.
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15Jo-Ann M. Adams, Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act to the Internet, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403, 405
(1996).
16Id. at 405-06. A major development by the government was the National Science
Foundation (NSF) net. Id. at 405. This network linked a few supercomputer research
centers with researchers at remote academic and government institutions. Id. The NSF
network began to expand dramatically and is primarily responsible for shaping the
modern Internet. Id. at 406-07. See also Arne, supra note 10, at 14 (discussing the early
formation of the Internet as a tool for the research and academic community).
17Adams, supra note 15, at 406-07. Adams notes the government developers had not
totally envisioned the monster they were creating and its ramifications, Adams notes one
of the main developers initial reaction to the DOD request was: "Sure we could build
such a thing, but I don't see why anybody would want it." Id. (quoting Gary Anthes, The
History of the Future: As the ARPNET Turns 25, its Founders Reunite to Talk About the
Network That Became the Internet, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 3, 1994, at 101).
18George P. Long, III Comment, Who are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace,
55 U. PITT L.REV. 1177, 1178 (1994) (noting that the Internet is conservatively
estimated to connect well over twenty million people) (quoting Barbara Kantrowitz et al,
Live Wires, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1993 at 42,43); see also Adams, supra note 15, at
406-07 (stating the Internet is growing at the rate of five to eight percent per month and
reaches ninety-two countries) (quoting Joe Clark, The Online Universe: Find Out Why
Some 30 Million People Count Themselves as Citizens of this Mysterious World,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20, 1994, at J1; Internet Crime Soars, INFORMATIONWEEK
Oct 10, 1994, at 20).
19THE INTERNET UNLEASED 1996, supra note 12, at 4. The authors note the Internet
"is the largest international association of people . . . and is growing everyday." Id. "The
number of networks linked to the Internet now is in excess of 45,000 with approximately
5 million host computers." Id.
20Long, supra note 18, at 1178 (quoting Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace,
TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 62). Long notes that the Internet is really the forerunner of the so
called "information superhighway" and it will be vital in helping to form a new national
information infrastructure. Id.
21See generally Richard Wiley and Robert Butler, National Information Infrastructure:
Preserving Personal Space in Cyberspace, 12-Fall COMM. LAW. 1 (1994) (discussing
the power of electronic media and online communications have in informing the public
and shaping the way we conduct both our professional business and personal
relationships and the problems such potential brings in the form of intruding on our
perceived privacy); Richard Carelli, Supreme Court Agrees to Decide on Restricting
Access to the Internet, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 7, 1996 at A12 (noting
that it is difficult to estimate the size of the Internet because of its rapid growth).
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22Adams, supra note 15, at 408 (defining the Wild West as the western United States in
its frontier period (citing WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE Unabridged 2616 (3d ed. 1986))); see also Long, supra
note 18, at 1181 (comparing the Internet today "to the American West of the 1800s: an
uncharted 'electronic frontier' that has yet to be fully explored.") (citing ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, BIG DUMMY'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET (1993)).
23 See infra Part IV.
24THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 1996, supra note 12, at 4 (noting the Internet is a
cooperative venture with no central authority that began as an education and scientific
network). See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). "The Internet is an
international system." Id. at 831. It is "a decentralized, global medium of
communications--or 'cyberspace'--that links people, institutions, corporations, and
governments around the world. . . . This communications medium allows any of the
literally tens of millions of people with access to the Internet to exchange information."
Id. "No single entity--academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit--administers the
Internet. It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of
separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided to use
common data transfer protocol to exchange communications and information with other
computers (which in turn exchange communications and information with still other
computers)." Id. at 832.
25Adams, supra note 15, at 408. See also Fulton, supra note 1, at 69 (stating the FCC has
"determined that it will not regulate computer communication in any manner different
from voice communication" and "[w]ithout direction from Congress, the FCC will
continue to regard computer communications as being outside the realm of regulation.").
26See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("There is no centralized
storage location, control point, or communications channel for the Internet, and it would
not be technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the information conveyed on
the Internet.").
27Long, supra note 18, at 1181 (arguing the same decentralization of the Internet that
makes it difficult to use in exploring and searching for subjects, will also make it difficult
if not impossible to regulate in any effective manner).
28THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 1996, supra note 12, at 31. The Society is a voluntary
body whose stated goal is:
The Society will provide assistance and support to groups and organizations involved in
the use, operation, and evolution of the Internet. It will provide support for forums in
which technical and operational questions can be discussed and provide mechanisms
through which the interested parties can be informed and educated about the Internet, its
function, use, operation, and the interest of its constituents.
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Id.
29Id. at 31-32.
30 Id. at 4.
31Id.
32See Adams, supra note 15, at 408. (stating the Internet's "roots lie in liberal U.S.
academic institutions, and freedom of speech and an 'anything goes' credo are vital
components of 'Internet ethos') (quoting Malcom Wheatley, Auntie Ventures into Taboo
Zone, THE INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, July 31, 1994, at 12).
33Long, supra note 18, at 1182 (noting that with this benefit comes the potential for
abuse).
34Adams, supra note 15, at 404. Adams goes on to note that because of its rapid
expansion, "The Internet has developed its own dark alleys and red light districts." Id.
35 See infra Part IV.
36See Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the
Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961) (tracing the history and importance of anonymous
writing in our society and early case law developments leading up to what the authors
call the constitutional right to anonymity). See also Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191 (1996) (discussing the legal and social rules and norms
surrounding anonymity, stating, "If parties with valuable information can choose between
making anonymous and non-anonymous communication, it is likely they will convey
more (or simply more accurate) information than they would in a world where
anonymous communications are effectively barred by social conventions or enforceable
legal rules. Anonymity allows communication without retribution.") Id. at 2192-93.
37The best example is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (confronting the controversial
issue of a woman's constitutional right to abortion). See also Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (the companion case to Roe v. Wade). See generally Adam A. Milani, Doe v. Roe:
An Argument for Defendant Anonymity when a Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a
Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41 WAYNE L.REV. 1659 (1995); Joan Steinman, Public
Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants be Permitted to Keep Their
Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1985); Wendy M. Rosenberger, Note,
Anonymity in Civil Litigation: The "Doe" Plaintiff, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 580
(1982).
38But see I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1011-12 (1994). Hardy notes that such traditional forms of anonymous
communications such as letters and phone calls have a semi built-in deterrence due to
some added costs such as mailing and the time constraints in making phone calls in
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addition to being more likely to leave a paper trail. Id. These forms of communications
lack the ability to reach thousands, perhaps millions, of people almost instantaneously
like electronic forms of communications such as e-mail. Id. at 1012 & 1027 n.80. Thus,
while anonymity may be available to us presently in these traditional forms, the new
medium of cyberspace drastically reduces their current deterrent elements so as to make
the "problem of anonymity . . . a 'new' one." Id. at 1011-12.
39See Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with
Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 402 (1996)
("There is no consensus, nor is there likely to be, as to whether, on balance anonymity is
good. Anonymity has both valuable and harmful consequences, and different persons
weigh these differently."); see also Levmore, supra note 36 (outlining the use of
anonymity in society and how it may encourage some communications).
40See E. Brian Davis, A Look at One of the Most Popular Services in Cyberspace:
Usenet, 42 FED. LAW. 15 (July 1995). Davis defines a Usenet newsgroup as "a
discussion area designed to allow the exchange of 'articles' or 'posts' sent to the
newsgroup. Id. Each article can be accessed by everyone subscribed to the newsgroup. Id.
Follow-ups can then be sent to the newsgroup to engage the discussion, or a reply can be
sent only to the person who posted the original article." Id. See also Long, supra note 18,
at 1181-82 (describing the difference between the Internet and the Usenet as the Usenet
existing as a part on the Internet but is more confined in its application). See THE
INTERNET UNLEASHED 1996, supra note 12, at 281. Although the Usenet is often
described as a network, it is not one in a formal sense. Id. "Instead, it is a number of
machines that exchange electronic mail tagged with predetermined subject headers." Id.
41THE INTERNET UNLEASHED, supra note 12, at 280.
42Long, supra note 18, at 1181-82 (Long likens a Usenet newsgroup to a physical
bulletin board in being able to post messages, but notes that online messages are much
different in their wide reach and instantaneous delivery).
43Long, supra note 18, at 1183. The information your message carries is called the
header. Id. This portion of your message contains the computer equivalent of the
geographic origin of the message and the senders name and often the e-mail address,
much like the return address on an envelope. Id.
44Id.
45See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 1, at 14-17 (discussing the concept of
anonymity on the Net noting that a large portion of the activities occur under assumed
names or "handles." They also discuss the use of the anonymous remailers and file
transfer protocols which allow the transfer of files at high speeds anonymously).
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46David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity,
and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 150 (discussing the
traceability of e-mail with a pseudonymous address).
47See Long, supra note 18, at 1183-87 (discussing the growth and debate over
anonymous servers and how they are becoming increasingly criticized by some Usenet
groups); see also Froomkin, supra note 39, at 414-27 (outlining how the Internet enables
anonymous communication through the use of these remailers which will allow both
traceable and untraceable anonymity).
48See Froomkin, supra note 39, at 415-16 (discussing the features of anonymous
remailing services noting all serious remailers share this feature of deleting identifying
information).
49 Id.
50Froomkin, supra note 39, at 417-18. See also Long, supra note 18, at 1184-85. Long
discusses the use of the anon.penet.fi remailer server, in which the service administrator
still has the ultimate access to the information of who sent the original message and may
upon being pressured by law enforcement or others reveal the source. Id. "[O]nly an
anonymous server with a trustworthy administrator will offer virtually complete
anonymity." Id. Froomkin noted the dangers and risks of such services by providing the
recent example of the Church of Scientology who sued and used subpoenas against one
such remailer service to obtain the identity of the person they alleged was spreading
copyrighted Church teaching online. Froomkin, supra note 39, at 425-26. See also Noah
Levine, Note Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous Communication in
Cyberspace, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1996). Minimal liability is imposed on
remailers so long as they remain ignorant of the content of the messages they are
remailing. Id. at 1557. This encourages remailers to adopt a no questions asked attitude.
Id. Levine argues that reform is needed so that anonymous remailers would be
encouraged to operate their services more responsibly. The best way to do this the author
argues is to subject the administrators to liability for illegal acts of their users in those
situations in which a "responsible" operator would have prevented such an act from
occurring. Id at 1558.
51See Froomkin, supra note 39, at 418-21. Froomkin describes the "chained remailing"
process as probably the most anonymous form of directed communication available. This
process along with encryption will ensure the user that:
(1) none of the remailer operators will be able to read the text of the message because it
has been multiply encrypted in a fashion that requires the participation of each operator in
turn before the message can be read; (2) neither the recipient nor any remailer operators
in the chain (other than the first in line) can identify the sender of the text without the
cooperation of every prior remailer's operator; (3) therefore it is impossible for the
recipient of the message to connect the sender to the text unless every single remailer in
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the chain both keeps a log of its message traffic and is willing to share this information
with the recipient (or is compelled to do so by a court or other authority).
Id.
52See Levine, supra note 50, at 1530-31 (1996) (describing the remailer as the
"anonymity tool" having significant benefit in encouraging open and frank discussions on
a variety of difficult topics such as child abuse, AIDS, unpopular beliefs and whistle
blowing, with the most significant benefit of facilitating free speech and that "[t]his
benefit should not be underestimated.").
53See Patrick F. McGowan, The Internet and Intellectual Property Issues, in GLOBAL
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 1996: MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION at
303, 307 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series
No. 455, 1996). McGowan maintains the Internet will eventually reach and effect
virtually every aspect of society. Id. He notes a search on the legal database of NEXIS for
the term "Internet" in 1984 revealed only 75 hits. Id. By 1994, the same search resulted in
37,220 hits. Id. He conservatively projects the amount for the year end of 1996 to be well
over 300,000. Id. He goes on to illustrate the commercial opportunities on the Net, noting
that in 1995, advertisers spent up to $140 million on Internet ads. Id. at 316. He notes that
by the year 2000 this amount spent on Internet advertising is projected to go as high as $4
billion. Id. The opportunities are virtually limitless in light of the Telecommunication Act
of 1996 which will allow the television, phone, and cable industries to compete in each
others markets. Id. at 324. Single companies can now own a much larger and more
comprehensive piece of the telecommunications pie as a result of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the recently relaxed ownership restrictions in both
the broadcasting and telephone industries. Id. See also THE INTERNET UNLEASHED
1996, supra note 12, at 35. Commercialization is growing on the Internet as "Tens of
thousands of businesses are already actively using the Internet for a multitude of business
functions, including marketing and sales." As transactions become more secure, expect
virtual storefronts and cybermalls to grow dramatically. Id. at 35.
54McGowan, supra note 53, at 307 (describing intellectual property issues as the "most
important substantive legal issues involving information being transmitted over the
Internet."); see generally Byron Marchant, Online on the Internet: First Amendment and
Intellectual Property Uncertainties in the On Line World, 39 HOW. L.J. 477 (1996)
(discussing the Internet and intellectual property issues in depth and attempting to
determine the most cost effective means of law enforcement and regulation of such issues
in the online world and discussing the various forms of civil liability involving issues of
defamation, privacy violations, and slander or libel); See also Victoria A. Cundiff, Stop
Cyber Theft: Respecting Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet, in 16TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW at 93, 96 (PLI Pat., Trademarks, and Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 444, 1996) (analyzing the potential problems and legal
issues that are involved that can be encountered in posting, downloading, or
retransmitting messages on the Internet).
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55See David Bender, Emerging Personal Jurisdictional Issues on the Internet, in PLI'S
SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at 7, 10
(PLI Pat., Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 453, 1996)
(discussing the issue of the extent a web site operator in one state or forum submits
themselves to the jurisdiction of another state or forum by the establishment of the site
and allowing or partaking in related activities). See also Richard S. Zembek, Comment,
Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of
Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 367 (1996) (tracing the traditional concepts
of jurisdiction into the new computer medium and arguing that the existing rules and
norms can be adapted to deal with the issues that arise when a non-resident defendant's
contacts with a forum state are simply electronic travels or communications in the
medium of cyberspace).
56See Randy Gainer, Allocating the Risk of Loss for Bank Card Fraud on the Internet, 15
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 39 (1996) (analyzing the risks involved in
electronic transfer of funds over the Internet and examining the statutory and contractual
framework that determines who should bear the loss if Internet consumer's data are
misused). See also A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995) (discussing
cryptography which is the art of creating and disguising messages so only certain people
can see the true message, and the value of encryption to the banks, ATM-users, electronic
transactor, businesses with commercial and trade secrets, and the general public who use
cellular telephones, faxes, e-mail, or who send other sensitive personal data
electronically).
57See Brian G. Gilpin, Attorney Advertising and Solicitation on the Internet: Complying
with Ethics Regulations and Netiquette, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
697 (1995) (examining how attorneys can utilize the Internet to advertise their
professional services without violating ethics regulations or breaching Netiquette).
58See e.g., Richard A. Horning, Has Hal Signed A Contract: The Statute of Frauds in
Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 253 (1996)
(discussing the opportunities on the Net for contract formation by interchange of
electronic messages and weather such contracts are compatible with the statute of frauds);
Paul E. Geller, Conficts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright in a
Digitally Networked World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571 (1996) (analyzing how
to reconcile traditional conflict and choice of law concepts in the emerging medium of
cyberspace and if these two concepts can be reconciled in dealing copyright issues on the
Internet); James D. Cigler et al., Cyberspace: The Final Frontier for International Tax
Concepts?, 7 J. INT'L TAX'N 340 (1996) (examining traditional tax laws and their
consequences as commerce is expanding to global proportions over the Internet); Albert
Gidari, Privilege and Confidentiality in Cyberspace, 13 COMPUTER L. 1 (No. 2, 1996)
(discussing the debate over security, privilege, and confidentiality in cyberspace);
Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth
Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1093 (1996) (examining
"what restraints might exist under the Fourth Amendment doctrine on the government's
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ability to discover and prosecute possession of [] 'digital contraband'"); Natacha D.
Steimer, Note, Cyberlaw: Legal Malpractice in the Age of Online Lawyers, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 332 (1995) (illustrating how legal professionals have increasingly
utilized the Internet to solicit new clients with the use of electronic bulletin boards where
subscribers can ask legal questions and the attorney respond hoping to bring in a client
and noting that when subscribers rely on this information and suffer an injury, they may
be able to obtain recourse against the attorney providing the information through a legal
malpractice action); David K. Mcgraw, Note, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The
Problem of Unwelcome E-Mail, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 491 (1995)
(discussing the use of sexually offensive e-mail messages on the Net and what legal
remedies are available or should be available for people who receive such unwanted
messages).
59 See Adams, supra note 15.
60See Levine, supra note 50, at 1533. The risks are reduced for such crimes as electronic
stalking, hate mail, libel, trademark or copyright infringement if such activities are
conducted anonymous. Id. at 1534. Unlike regular mail, in which inherent clues in a
message may reveal the senders identity, in cyberspace there are no real fingerprints so
when the remailer strips the "digital fingerprint" little risk remains that the sender's
identity will be discovered. Even though it is possible to deliver the message
electronically in a manner that makes it essentially untraceable the risk still remains that
writing patterns, or other intrinsic identifiers, will reveal the identity of the author.
Froomkin, supra note 39, at 402. Id. See also Anonymous, Note, supra note 36
("Anonymity, it is asserted, will serve as a cloak for the progenitor of irresponsible ideas;
it may encourage the making of unfounded charges which the author would fear to raise
if he knew he would be subject to public censure were they probably false.").
61McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1537 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia was discussing anonymity in the context of campaign literature and an
Ohio election disclosure law. Id. at 1537. The majority struck down Ohio's statutory
prohibition against distribution of any anonymous campaign literature as they found it to
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 1524. Scalia goes on in disagreeing with the majority
stating, "to strike down the Ohio law in its general application--and similar laws of 48
other states and the Federal Government--on the ground that all anonymous
communication in our society traditionally sacrosanct, seems to me a distortion of the
past that will lead to a coarsening of the future." Id.
62See Branscomb, supra note 4, at 1645 (discussing accountability of anonymous
defamatory or illegal messages and noting that "without accountability, there is no basis
upon which an injured party can initiate a tort action to redress grievances.").
63Id. Victims seeking some form of compensation will be unable to track down the
anonymous source or if they are fortunate enough to do so, the source may prove to be
uncollectible without any resources. Id. Thus, "potential litigants and their legal counsel
have not hesitated to seek the source of the deepest pockets." Id.
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64 Id.
65See Anthony L. Clapes, The Wages of Sin: Pornography and Internet Providers, 13
COMPUTER L. 1 (No. 7, 1996) (discussing the passage of the Telecommunication Act
of 1996 which brought technology and the First Amendment to clash as the Act aims to
control obscene and indecent online communications); Dawn L. Johnson, It's 1996: Do
You Know Where Your Cyberkids Are? Captive Audiences and Content Regulation on
the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 51, 60-63 (1996)
(discussing the First Amendment's guarantees and noting that its protections do not
extend to obscenity and the right to distribute or transmit obscene materials); Jeffrey E.
Faucette, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Obscenity Doctrine and a
Frightened University's Censorship of Sex on the Internet, 44 DUKE L.J. 1155 (1995)
(discussing how Carnegie Mellon University removed a group of topics from the Usenet
newsgroups subscribed to by the University computer system and available on the
Internet to its students because they contained encoded sexually explicit images. The
University feared some of the images may be "obscene" by the Supreme Court and the
university feared liability under a state obscenity statute).
66See Andrew Spett, Comment, A Pig in the Parlor: An Examination of Legislation
Directed at Obscenity and Indecency on the Internet, 26 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV.
599, 603-11 (1996). Spett notes that obscenity has been unprotected expression since the
holding in CommonWealth v. Sharpless, 2 S.R. 91 (1815) because it lacks any social
value or importance. Id. at 603. The common law conviction in Sharpless was "premised
upon the exhibition, for profit, of a nude picture." Id. at 603 n.30. Spett offers the
Supreme Court's reasoning for upholding laws that prohibit obscenity:
(1) An arguable correlation between exposure to obscene material and crime; (2) The
power of the states "to make morally neutral judgments" that public exhibition of obscene
material,or commerce in the obscene, tends to "injure the community as a whole" by
polluting the "public environment"; and (3) The deleterious effect that obscene material
has upon the public, because "what is commonly read and seen and heard and done
intrudes upon us all, want it or not."
Id. at 603-04 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§12-16 at 917 (2nd ed. 1988))(quoting from Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 58-60 (1973)).
67See infra Part V (discussing the Communications and Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. ( 223
which is primarily aimed at restricing the access of minors to indecent or offensive
material via the Internet or any "telecommunications device").
68Adams, supra note 15, at 412-13 (citing a Carnegie Mellon University study found in
Dan Coats, "Dark side" of the Internet, Wash. Post, June 30, 1995 at A23. But see
Clapes, supra note 65, at 2 noting that, while the Carnegie Mellon study (with its
"methodological flaws and conclusory leaps") collected volumes of material from one
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portion of the Internet, "the proportion of all Internet - accessible information that is
pornographic is probably vanishingly small")).
69See Spett, supra note 66, at 606, setting forth the Supreme Court's notion of
community standards as:
(a)Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
that the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)Whether the
material depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c)Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
70See generally Zanghi, supra note 3 (arguing that the Supreme Court needs to
reconsider the traditional community standards test in obscenity cases as technological
advances and computers have altered the community into a global one). See also United
States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). The Thomas' were a California couple
who created and operated an adult bulletin board system from their home. Id. at 705. A
U.S. Postal Inspector in Tennessee downloaded sexually explicit images from the service.
Id. The couple was prosecuted and convicted in federal court in Tennessee under Federal
obscenity laws. Id. at 705-06. A request for change of venue to a Federal court in
California was denied, in part, because even under Federal obscenity laws the applicable
community standard is that of the receiving community. Id. at 710-12.
71 See generally Johnson, supra note 65 (discussing the material easily available to
children on the Internet).
72See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge
to a New York law which prohibited the distribution of material depicting children
involved in sexual conduct, holding "child pornography as a category of material outside
the protection of the First Amendment.").
73Arguably such material is found in adult-only bulletin board services requiring
subscribers identity. See Pamela A. Huelster, Cybersex and Community Standards, 73
B.U. L. Rev. 865, 881 (1995). But see Clapes, supra note 65, at 2-3. Clapes maintains
that minor obstacles to accessing pornography are easily overcome, primarily because of
the Net's focus on usability in creation of site list by topics and hyperlinks. Id. A person
of any age and hardly any computer experience could find such pornographic material
with the ease of selecting a T.V. channel. Id.
74See Adams, supra note 15, at 413-14 (noting pedophilia stalking is found in both the
private and public areas of the Net with the majority taking place in the public chat rooms
where participants engage in interactive conversations).
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75Id. at 414. See also id. at n.74 recounting various attempts pedophiles have used the
Internet to lure children from their homes; see Vincent J. Schodolski, Online Anonymity
Conducive to Vice; Teens are Vulnerable in Cyberspace, CHI. TRIB. June 11, 1995, at
19 (teenage girl missing since accepting an offer from a man via her computer); Mary
Murphy, Computer Prowlers Stalk Kids, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 9, 1995, at 1
(man convicted after using the Net to solicit lewd pictures and then sent the children
Polaroid cameras. Another man exchanged explicit e-mail messages and pictures with
whom he thought was a teenage boy, the "boy" was actually an undercover officer who
arrested the man when he flew to Florida to meet his teenage date); Barbara Kantowitz, et
al., Child Abuse in Cyberspace, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 18, 1994, at 40 (a professional
engineer used the Net to arrange a meeting with a teenage boy. He blindfolded and bound
the boy before bringing him to his home. Once there, the boy was spanked, forced to
have an enema, have his legs and pubic hair shaved, and was forced to partake in anal
and oral sex. The father of the boy found out about the incident when the boy was forced
to described the events on line before he could be set free).
76 While this concern for children safety does appear to be a compelling justification for
regualtion of the Internet, many people seem to ignore the fact that the Internet is
uniquely interactive. The user must activley seek out the information transmitted into
their homes. Thus, the Internet is unlike the pervasiveness of the T.V. and other mediums
where children may be exposed to material without much, if any, active interaction.
Parental control must be a guiding concern when children start to explore the Internet.
Parents would not let their children talk to any stranger on the street, while just over a
million children surf the Internet doing just that. Dee Pridgen, How will Consumers be
Protected on the Information Superhighway?, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 237, 24546 (1997) (citing Business News Brieting, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 12, 1996,
at A56).
77See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1131-37 (12th ed. 1991)
(discussing the extent the First Amendment prevents efforts to limit speech which is
thought as harmful and offensive to minorites noting that most of the Supreme Court's
decisions in this area deal with speech and demonstrations by Nazi groups and
regualtions of racist speech on college campuses); Adams, supra note 15, at 415 (noting
that a broad range of right wing extremists, from the Aryan Nation to militia groups now
speak to the world via the Internet and that since Neo Nazi groups have been banned
from selling their books in Germany, they now distribute their message worldwide via the
Internet); Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Taking A Bite Out of Hate Crimes, 57 OR.ST. B.
BULL 9, 9-10 (Nov. 1996) (defining a hate crimes as, "assaults and other attacks
committed for discriminatory reasons" that are intended to reach beyond the individual
victim and intimidate an entire community which may be targeted for its marginalized
status).
78Adams, supra note 15, at 414. Adams discusses the emerging issues of stalking via
computers noting "the ratio of men to women on the Internet is three to one." Id. Adams
provides the example of two women in Connecticut who were harassed over the Internet.
Id. (citing Jonathan Roubinovitz, Rules of the Road on the Information Highway: Law
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Makes Harassing by Computer a Crime, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1995, at B4). The first
woman, who ran a computer bulletin board from her home was electronically bombarded
with files intended to crash her system. Id. The second incident, a woman who was
repeatedly threatened by e-mail, prompted a state representative to introduce legislation
to address the problem. Id.
79 See supra note 75.
80See Martha Siegel, Anarchy, Chaos, on the Internet Must End, S.F. CHRON. Jan 2,
1995, at A19 (arguing that legislation should be passed to create safety and order in
cyberspace and that guidance from the federal communication commission is needed).
See also Walter S. Mossberg, Personal Technology, Wall St. J., Jan 26, 1995, at B1
(arguing "accountability is key to democracy" and that "online services [need to] act to
strengthen accountability and open civil debate. . . ."; anonymity as the author views it
will limit such accountability).
81CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). The statute
provides:
(a) A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when: (1) by telephone, he
addresses another in or uses indecent or obscene language; or (2) with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, by
electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by
computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or (3) with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.
(b) For purposes of this section such offense may be deemed to have been committed
either at the place where the telephone call was made, or at the place where it was
received.
(c)The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or
more psychiatrists.
(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.
Id.
8218 PA. CONST. STAT. § 910 (1983 & 1997 Supp.) Section 910 of the statute
provides:
(A) Offense defined.--Any person commits an offense if he:
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(1) makes, distributes, possesses, uses or assembles an unlawful telecommunication
device or modifies, alters, programs or reprograms a telecommunication device designed,
adapted or which can be used:
(i) for commission of a theft of telecommunication service or to acquire or facilitate the
acquisition of telecommunication service without the consent of the telecommunication
service provider; or
(ii) to conceal or to assist another to conceal from any telecommunication service
provider or from any lawful authority the existence or place of origin or of destination of
any telecommunication; or
(2) sells, possesses, distributes, gives or otherwise transfers to another, or offers,
promotes, or advertises for sale, any:
(i) unlawful telecommunication device, or plans or instructions for making or assembling
the same, under circumstances evidencing an intent to use or employ such unlawful
telecommunication device, or to allow the same to be used or employed for a purpose
described in paragraph (1), or knowing or having reason to believe that the same is
intended to be so used, or that the aforesaid plans or instructions are intended to be used
for the making or assembling such unlawful telecommunication device; or
(ii) material, including hardware, cables, tools, data, computer software or other
information or equipment, knowing that the purchaser or a third person intends to use the
material in the manufacture of an unlawful telecommunication device.
Id.
83GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (1996). The statute provides:
(A) It shall be unlawful for any person, any organization, or any representative of any
organization knowingly to transmit any data through a computer network or over the
transmission facilities or through the network facilitates of a local telephone network for
the purpose of setting up, maintaining, operating, or exchanging data with an electronic
mailbox, home page, or any other electronic information storage bank or point of access
to electronic information if such data uses any individual name, trade name, registered
trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol to falsely identify the
person, organization, or representative transmitting such data or which would falsely state
or imply that such person, organization, or representative has permission or is legally
authorized to use such trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or
copyrighted symbol for such purpose when such permission or authorization has not been
obtained; provided, however, that no telecommunications company or Internet access
provider shall violate this Code section solely as a result of carrying or transmitting such
data for its customers.
Id.
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8447 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (1997 Supp.) (making it illegal for whoever, "makes a
telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or
communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person at the called number or who receives the
communications.").
85See Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(challenging 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)) and ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(challenging 47 U.S.C. §§ 223 (a)(1)(B), (a)(2), d(1), d(2)). See also Reno v. ACLU 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding the CDA unconstitutionally vauge and overbroad).
86See § 223. The section prohibits the use of a telecommunications device to "knowingly
make[], create[], or solicit[] and initiate[] the transmission of any "comment request,
suggestion, proposal, image or other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient is under 18 years of age." § 223(a)(1)(B). Further, § 223
(d)(1)(B) prohibits the use of a computer to send or display to anyone under 18 "any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the
user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication." § 223(d)(1)(B).
87 See supra note 84.
88The district court heard the challenge of the CDA under Pub.L. 104-104(a). § 561
provides any civil action challenging the constitutionality of the act or any amendment
made by the CDA or any provision thereof, shall be heard by a district court of three
judges convened pursuant to the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 U.S.C. Pub. L.
104-104(a) § 561 (1996). Further, any order or judgment holding the unconstitutional is
reviewable as a matter of right by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. See Pub.L. 104104(b) § 561 (1996).
89ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856-57. The court goes on to note that enforcement of current
obscenity and child pornography laws are adequate to address the problems the CDA
sought to rectify and that the Justice Department itself indicated in the hearings on the
CDA that it was prosecuting online obscenity, child pornography and child solicitation
under existing laws, and would continue to do so. Id. Thus, the court determined, "It
follows that the CDA is not narrowly tailored, and the government's attempt to defend it
on that ground must fail." Id.
90 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
91 Id. at 2345.
92 Id. Justice Stevens noted that such a burden on adult speech is unacceptable as less
restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the purposes the CDA
was enacted to serve. The Court concluded that as the statute was not narrowly tailored to

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 31 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 3

meet its objectives, it "threatens to torch a large segement of the Internet community." Id.
at 2350.
93 Id. at 2350.
94ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849; see also id. at 871-72 (noting that conversations on the
AIDS web page includes safer sex discussions in "street language" for easy
comprehension and also names specific sexual practices describes the risk for the
transmission of the HIV virus associated with each practice, and that operators of similar
sites which allow the transmission of traditionally "indecent" material "could legitimately
fear prosecution under the Communications Decency Act").
95See id. at 883 discussing the value of the Internet stating:
..the Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide conversation. The
Government may not...interrupt that conversation. As the most participatory form of mass
speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental
intrusion....Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty
depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment
protects.
See also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997) stating:
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom
of expression as a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship.
96"This is a really important case..that decides freedom to speak and freedom to read for
the next century." Danny Weitzner of the Center for Democracy and Technology, quoted
by Richard Carelli in, Supreme Court Agrees to Decide on Restricting Access to Internet,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 7, 1996, at 12A.
97 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. The Court reviewed and recognized its precedents on
content-based regulations of speech and concluded these cases did not require them to
uphold the CDA and were fully consistent with the application of the most stringent
review of the statute.
98 It appears the Court is now more confident and unified in approaching cyberspace
issues as compared with their previous decision in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. F.C.C., 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). There the Court
appeared hesitant and fractured about the indecency restrictions in question and how they
applied to cable television. In contrast, the Court in Reno appeared confident and reached
unexpected harmony on some basic principles regarding the Internet and Cyberspace.
Justice Steven's opinion was joined by all the Justices except Chief Justice Renquist and
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Justice O'Connor who both partially dissented. However, both agreed with the majority
on key Internet issues and that the core provisions of the CDA were unconstitutional.
99See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 301-02
(1941) (Black, J., dissenting) ([f]reedom to speak and write about public questions is as
important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human body. . . . [T]his
privilege is the heart of our government."); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) (stating there is a, "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. . . ."); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("there [is] time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
101See E. Walter Van Valkenburg, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 75 OR. L.
REV. 319, 329 (1996) ("The Internet poses the potential for as dramatic a transformation
of global communications as the world has ever seen.").
102See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
Homes observed that when suppression of opposing speech does not yield success "men
may come to believe [that] . . . [W]hen the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that the truth is the only ground upon which their
wished safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Id.
While our founding fathers surely did not envision the Internet, it stands to serve the
basic goals of the First Amendment to allow citizens to express their ideas openly in a
public forum without the fear of government restrictions and reprisals for what is said.
103See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). "The Internet is . . . a unique
and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication." Id. at 844. "The types of
content now on the Internet defy easy classification . . . It is no exaggeration to conclude
that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought." Id. at. 842.
104Ted Anthony, Cyber Optimist, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 31, 1996, at
5C. The article goes on to discuss Microsoft's new Internet philosophy and how Gates is
positioning the company to help guide the Internet through its growing pains.
105See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating that the purpose of the
First Amendment is "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes by the people"). See also Board of Education v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 866 (1982) ("our precedents have focused not only on the role of the First
Amendment in fostering individual self expression but also on its role in affording the
public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.")
(quoting First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
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106See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 115 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (noting that "a democracy cannot long survive unless the people
are provided the information needed to form judgments on issues that affect their ability
to intelligently govern themselves.").
107 See Long, supra note 18.
108Id. at 1178 (citing examples of information that may be sought or shared
anonymously or not at all; people who were sexually abused, those suffering from AIDS
or other communicable diseases, or the employee seeking to "blow the whistle" on unsafe
or discriminatory practices of his or her employer). See also Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of
Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 117 (1996)
(asserting anonymity is party of society and giving examples of conventionally
recognized practices such as suicide hotlines, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the use of the
secret ballot).
109See Froomkin, supra note 39, at 408-09 (stating that, in addition to personal benefits,
benefits may flow to society such as the overall improvement of public health as the
availability of anonymous access to more information on sexually transmitted diseases
and AIDS becomes known and is utilized).
110See Cass Sunstein, The Fist Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995)
(noting that the future may dramatically change society as online communications
eventually allow the best schools, teachers, resources of art, literature, and science, and
health care services to be available to everyone without regard to physical locations,
distance, or disability). It is true not every person can afford a home computer right now.
There is, however, a move to provide Internet access to all students by the year 2000.
Clinton, Gore Cite Progress in Wiring Nation's Schools, U.S. Newswire, Feb. 8, 1997,
available in Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS database (citing a fall 1996 survey done by the
U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics). An upcoming
FCC vote is expected to make $2.25 billion a year available to provide discounts to assist
in the effort to make Internet access available to every school child. Computer Link:
Short Circuits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 1, 1997 at 21. Currently, 65% of
public schools have at least one Internet connection. Clinton, Gore Cite Progress in
Wiring Nation's Schools, supra. Seventy-four percent of those that have Internet access
make that access available to students, so in approximately 47% of public school districts
students have some access to the Internet. Id. That access, however, is primarily in
bigger, wealthier, urban districts, as only 31% of schools with high poverty indicators
have Internet access. More Schools on the Internet, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 17,
1996 at A22 (citing the earlier mentioned study by the U.S. Department of Education). It
is also concentrated at the secondary level, with only 46% of elementary schools having
any Internet access. Id.
111McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516 (1995). The Court in
McIntyre goes on to note the significance of anonymity in the literary world by referring
to famous authors who used anonymity in publishing their works including; Mark Twain
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(Samuel Langhorne Clemens), O. Henry (William Sydney Porter), Benjamin Franklin
(various pseudonyms), Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet), George Eliot (Mary Ann
Evans), Charles Dickens ("Boz"). McIntyre at 1516 at n.4.
112Froomkin, supra note 39, at 408. Froomkin notes the legitimacy of anonymous
communications as a means of self-protection as some people may fear losing their jobs
or in the extreme death. Id. "Not everyone is so courageous as to which to be known for
everything they say, and some timourous speech deserves encouragement." Id.
113Id. ("Indeed, given the ability to broadcast messages widely using the Internet,
anonymous e-mail may become the modern replacement of the anonymous handbill.").
114Id. at 427. ("The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to be
anonymous in so many words. The First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and
freedom of assembly have, however, been understood for many years to provide
protections for at least some, and possibly a great deal of, anonymous speech and secret
association.").
115See Anonymous, Note, supra note 36, at 1088 (maintaining that there, "is a
recognized right to speak and write anonymously and to participate anonymously in
group activities. The Supreme Court has developed this right as a derivative of the
protection given speech, assembly, the press, religion, and petition by the first and
fourteenth amendments.").
116See Brief for Petitioner at 12-15, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct.
1511 (1995), available on Westlaw, 1994 WL 144557 (discussing how anonymous
leaflets have played an important role in the political development of the country by
allowing for the expression of views that were unpopular which ultimately broadened the
scope of political debate); "Throughout history, anonymity has often been essential for
political dissidents who faced persecution if their identities become known. Sometimes
their persecution takes the form of official prosecution. Sometimes it takes the form of
social ostracism." In either event, the ability to speak anonymously often provides a safe
haven for those who wish to express unpopular views. Id. at 12.
117See Anonymous, Note, supra note 36, at 1085 (noting that the use of anonymity was
used extensively by our founding fathers. The name "Publius" was used by Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay in publishing the Federalist papers, Hamilton and Madison both used
anonymity in using "The Letters of Pacificus" and "Letters of Helvidius" respectively in
debating each other, and Chief Justice Marshall writing as "a friend to the Republic."
"Between 1789 and 1809 no fewer than six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty
senators, and thirty-four congressmen published political writings either unsigned or
under pen names.").
118362 U.S. 60 (1960). Talley dealt with the prosecution for a violation of a municipal
ordinance which prohibited the distribution of anonymous handbills. The Court found the
ordinance unconstitutional as it violated the freedom of speech and press. Id. at 65.
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However, the Court cautioned that it was not making a judgment about the
constitutionality of an ordinance that was specifically aimed or narrowly tailored to
prevent a particular evil. Id. at 64.
119Id. at 64-65. See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1517 at
n.6 (1995) (listing famous historical figures who were the probable authors of
pseudonymously published political works including; Alexander Hamilton, John Jay,
New York Governor George Clinton, Samuel Bryan, Richard Henry Lee, and Robert
Yates.)
120115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
121McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
122Id.
123Id. The majority of the leaflets were signed "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Id.
See id. n.2 (showing a copy of Mrs. McIntyre's leaflet).
124McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
125See id. n.3 (containing the text of the disclosure statue, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§
3599.09(A) (1988)). The state supreme court upheld the conviction by a divided vote
concluding that the disclosure law "should be upheld if the burden imposed on First
Amendment rights were 'reasonable' and 'non-discriminatory.'" Id. at 1515. They went on
to conclude that the statute was reasonable and non-discriminatory as it did not impact
the "content of message nor significantly burden their ability to have it disseminated." Id.
at 1515.
126McIntyre, 115 S. Ct at 1518. (holding that political speech is entitled to the highest
constitutional protection and that "the identity of the speaker is no different from any
other component . . . that the author is free to include or exclude.").
127Id. at 1516.
128Id. at 1518-19 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
129The majority concludes its opinion by stating, "Under our Constitution, anonymous
pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of
advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. (citation
omitted). It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation--and their
ideas from suppression--at the hand of an intolerant society." Id. at 1524.
130See Tien, supra note 108, at 121 (maintaining that the McIntyre decision stands for
"protecting the 'lonely pamphleteers' and the 'cheap speech of dissenters'" and that the
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Internet is the medium of cheap speech). But see Froomkin, supra note 39, at 428-33
(discussing anonymous political speech and its historical protections, but questioning if
online political speech will be afforded the same broad First Amendment protection,
noting that even traditional forms of political speech are not totally free from all
government interference and regulation).
131But see Whitt, infra note 137, at 435-38 (criticizing the majority decision in McIntyre,
maintaining that the Court did not fully explore why our Nation's founders thought it was
necessary to maintain anonymity and whether any legitimate reasons for anonymity still
exist today). Serious artistic and literary works continue to fall prey to censorship even
within the past few years. See Brief of Amicus Feminists for Free Expression ("FFE") at
2, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (No. 96-511). The FFE gives examples of recent
censored works including; the Diary of Anne Frank, Maya Angelou's I Know Why the
Caged Bird Sings, Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale, Judy Blume's Are You
There, God?, Its Me, Margaret, Nancy Garder's Annie on My Mind, and Alice Walker's
The Color Purple. Id. See also the web site The Most Frequently Banned Books in the
1990s at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/People/spok/most-banned.htnl.
132Seth Freimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1991).
133The Republican members of Congress were fearful of communist ideas within the
government and advanced using the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)
to launch investigations of members of the then Democrat-controlled executive branch.
Id. at 15-18 and n.44. Soon the anti-Communist fever spread and virtually all segments of
society from the entertainment industry to higher education to the private sector became
targets for investigation. Id. See also Friemer, supra note 132 (discussing the background
of McCarthyism and its effects on society at 14-26).
134See Freimer, supra note 132, at 20. The overall impact was great even on people not
directly accused or investigated. A national opinion survey from 1954 found that over
40% of the country felt "some [or all] were not as free to say what they [thought] as they
used to." Id. (alterations in original) A year later a survey of academic and scientists
showed 36% who stated their colleagues were less willing to put forth unpopular views
and that over 20% had refrained from expressing any controversial opinions. Id.
135Tien, supra note 108, at 123.
136Artists, critics, and authors all have valued the ability to work anonymously. A recent
example was the book Primary Colors which was authored anonymously and was a
"fictional" account of a Washington insider during the 1992 Presidential Primaries.
ANONYMOUS, PRIMARY COLORS (1996). It was later revealed the author was Joe
Klein, a CBS news Consultant and Newsweek Columist who now writes for the New
Yorker. See HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 12, 1997, 1997 WL 13056036.
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137See generally Tien, supra note 108. Tien throughly analyzes the McIntyre decision
and how its reasoning is consistent with society's modern concept of anonymity in
general in terms of self-identity and voluntary interaction. Id. Tien goes on to note that
"the same considerations of viewpoint discrimination that favored protection of
anonymous speech in McIntyre favor protection for online anonymous speech generally."
Id. at 121. See also George Trubow, Constitution vs. Cyberspace; Has the First
Amendment Met its Match?, 5 BUS. L. TODAY 41, 44 (1996) (arguing that while the
McIntyre case dealt with anonymous political literature, it will have "implications
regarding anonymity in cyberpasce"); Levine, supra note 50, at 1530- 32 (discussing the
McIntyre decision and how the Court valued the concept of anonymous speech);
Froomkin, supra note 39, at 428-43 (analyzing anonymous political speech and its First
Amendment protections as discussed in the McIntyre decision and what types of
restrictions on online speech are most likely to be upheld). But see id. at 433 doubting if
such protection will exist online stating, "As ringing a defense of the First Amendment as
the Talley and McIntyre decisions may be, they involved political speech. At most,
therefore, they merely suggest the outcome for cases involving anonymous speech that is
not 'political speech' and also not one of the areas of general public concern such as
religion, art, or literature, that commentators usually include within the rubric of so-called
'core' First Amendment speech." For other discussions of the McIntyre decision not
necessarily discussing its extended application to the Internet, see Leading Cases (pt. F),
109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 180-90 (1995); Mark A. Whitt, Note, McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n: "A Whole New Boutique of Wonderful First Amendment Litigation
Opens its Doors," 29 AKRON L. REV. 423 (1996).
138See Sunstein, supra note 110, at 1783-84 (discussing the economics and democracy of
the Internet stating, "[h]igh quality, substantive discussions may well be possible among
large numbers of people; town meetings that are genuinely deliberative may become
commonplace.").
139See Adams, supra note 15 (discussing public chat rooms and the interactive
conversations that take place in them).
140See Froomkin, supra note 39, at 441-42. Froomkin explains that the operators of
remailer services which provide the ability to mask a senders identity are themselves
unable to first tell what kind of "speech" the message contains because the messages are
sent to them encrypted. Id. at 442. "A ban on anonymous speech cannot therefore
meaningfully distinguish by subject matter, nor can it necessarily even distinguish
between visual depictions and mere words." Id.
141Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986).
142Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct
2338, 2347 (1995).
143The evils to be prevented [by the First Amendment] were not censorship of the press
merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free
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and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.
THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, at 886 (8th
ed. 1927).
144See Tien, supra note 108, at 126-29. Tien discusses how the "identity of the speaker
or author is an aspect of message content." Id. at 126. Tien basis this proposition on the
assertion in McIntyre that, "The identity of the speaker is no different from other
components of the document's content that the author is free to include or exclude." Id.
Tien concludes that any attempt of anonymity regulation would basically amount to
content regulation and "[a] general prohibition on online anonymity is almost certainly
too sweeping to pass constitutional muster because it would regulate protected speech."
Id. at. 128.
145Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
146Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459
(1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)). See also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544 (1989) ("The government may
not regulate speech based on hostility--or favoritism--towards the underlying message
expressed.").
147 See supra note 86.
148Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470.
[W]hen the government defends a regulation on speech . . . it must do more than simply
posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured (citation omitted) . . . It must
demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.
Id.
149The government has the right to restrict or control speech that is classified as obscene
or is involved with child pornography. See e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (actual depiction of sexual acts by
a child under sixteen); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
150See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (describing the purpose of the First
Amendment, "Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority . . . And in the realm of ideas it protects expression
which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.") (quoting Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) ("All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance--
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unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion--have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.").
151See e.g., Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2458 ("At the heart of the First
Amendmet lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system
and cultural life rest upon this ideal. (citations omitted) Government action that stifles
speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message
favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right"); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the state could not punish a protester who burned the
American flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(holding that students had the right to wear black armbands in school to voice their
protest over American involvement in the Vietnam War); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited all picketing except labor
picketing was unconstitutional because it selectively excluded one type of picketing from
a general ban because of the content of the message the picketing was intended to
convey).
152See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459 ("Our precedents thus apply the most
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content."). See also Denver Area Educ.
Telecommunications Consortium v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2385 (1996) ("This tradition teaches that the First Amendment embodies an overarching
commitment to protect speech from Government regulation through close judicial
scrutiny . . . .").
153ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 866 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
154See Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that if a "federal statute or regulation purports to limit freedom of expression, its
vagueness will 'operate [] to inhibit the exercise' of such freedom and violates the First
Amendment").
155ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 866 (A strict scrutiny analysis will require the government to
"demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.") (quoting
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1017 (1995)).
156When the author notes "traditional" freedom of speech he means those that "abridge"
or directly prohibit certain forms of speech.
157 See THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 1996, supra note 12.
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158NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("Inviolability of
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation
of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs"). See
also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984) (maintaining that two
important aspects of the First Amendment are the freedom to associate to engage in
protected speech and the protection to enter into and maintain certain intimate
relationships).
159357 U.S. 449 (1958).
160Id. at 452. The NAACP maintained the position that it was not subject to the statute in
question. Id. In the alternative, if it was subject to the statute mandatory disclosure of
membership would violate rights of speech and assembly. Id.
161Id. at 452-54. The organization feared reprisals to the individual members if such
information was revealed. Id. at 454.
162Id. at 462. The Court shared the same concerns of the NAACP regarding forced
identification of membership in that members would face threats forcing them to
withdraw and preventing others from joining. Id. at 462-63. The Court noted the, "vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." Id. at 462.
163See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating a state statute which
required public school teachers to reveal to the state contributions to or memberships in
any organization during the previous five years); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (holding the NAACP could deny the
government access to its membership lists on the basis of its right of association.); Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (extending protection beyond organizations members
to its contributors, when revelation of contributors would essentially be a revelation of
members).
164See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (stating the right to
associate is the ability "to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."). See also Tien, supra note
108, at 179-84. Tien discusses the Roberts decision and how the Court there
distinguished between expressive and intimate association rights noting expressive
association rights are protected on "instrumental" grounds while intimate association
rights are protected on "intrinsic" grounds as a "fundamental element of personal liberty."
Id. at 179 Tien goes on to speculate how association rights may be applied on the Internet
noting, "That individuals use online messages to associate provides another basis for First
Amendment protection, because prohibition of anonymity will also effectively prevent
associations from concealing their members' identities." Id. at 181.
165See Bovenzi, supra note 11, at 104.
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The identities of people using certain services or advocating certain views through
"anonymous" e-mail might well be of interest to the government; but the First
Amendment should allow and perhaps require sysops (system operators) to withhold that
information. Thus, sysops should be able to prevent the government from accessing all of
the information contained in their user records. (footnote omitted) Like the anonymous
pamphleteers and the NAACP members, their identities would seem to be protected by
the twin rights of privacy and assembly.
Id. (clarification added).
166See Tien, supra note 108, at 182.
A significant part of online life takes advantage of the way that online communications
allow geographical and other barriers to be transcended, so that persons may exchange
information and experiences about medical, sexual, familial, and other matters which go
to the heart of personal identity. These associations are both expressive and intimate, and
the state should not have the power to interfere with the groups' choice to permit
anonymity without substantial justification.
Id.; see also Cavazos & Morin, supra note 1, at 15-16 (discussing the Right to Associate
online and noting that an organization's mailing lists and bulletin board user lists are the
online equivalent of the organization's membership lists which the Court protected in the
NAACP case. "Surely, the sense of community that develops in some online situations
resembles an association for purposes of constitutional law analysis.").
167Jerry L. McDaniel, III, Comment, Constitutional Law: Florida's Privacy Protection
for Obscenity, 43 FLA. L. REV. 405, 405-08 & n.10 (1990). The traditonal concept of
privacy is that of freedom from intrusion into ones home or the "right to let alone" and is
often founded on the Ninth Amendment. Id. See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Discussing the fundamental right to be free
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy, noting the founders of the
Constitution:
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that
only part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone--the most
comprehensive of rights most valued by civilized man.
See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 15 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381. U.S. 479 (1965). For Supreme Court
decisions resting on the concept of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass
a right of privacy See e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 91972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.1 (1967); Pierce v. Society of
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Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generally
Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965); Russell L. Caplan, The
History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223 (1983); Thomas B.
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215
(1990).
168See Johns, supra note 1, at 1432-36. Johns discusses the privacy concerns of the
Internet in describing how the government may be able to avoid the Fourth Amendment
requirements by convincing online service providers to monitor private chat rooms or email messages out of the fear of liability being asserted against them. Id. The comment
notes that the recent investigation of the FBI in cooperation with American Online (AOL)
culminated in an FBI search of 125 homes and offices for allegedly using the online
service to distribute or receive child pornography. Id. at. 1435.
169See Brandeis & Warren, supra note 167, at 220 ("The common law has always
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers
engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance
to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity.").
170In fact, online privacy is valued and is receiving some protection under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2521, 2701-09, 2711, 3117-27
(1997). The Act basically provides that it is illegal for someone to intercept or discloses
the contents of any private electronic communication. See also Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp 432 (W.D. Tex.1993) (finding the
government violated the ECPA in seizing the plaintiff's computer system containing the
company's bulliten board service).
171CAVAZOS AND MORIN, supra note 1, at xiii. "The law, especially as it relates to
computer-mediated communications is constantly changing. Existing statutes are
amended, reinterpreted, and repealed and new statutes are enacted . . . The problems that
result from attempts to define a dynamic system using a static medium are obvious-the
solutions less so." Id. See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 858-59 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
("First Amendment jurisprudence has developed into a study of intertwining standards
and applications, perhaps as a necessary response to our ever-evolving culture and modes
of communication.").
172See Johns, supra note 1, at 1437 (stating, "Cyberspace blurs the boundaries between
once distinct media and thus demands evolutionary and even revolutionary approaches . .
. in formulating new legal doctrine, lawmakers should recognize, empower and learn
from the multitude of self-regulating structures that have already been developed by the
users and administrators of cyberspace"). See also Fulton, supra note 1, at 64 ("The rapid
growth of computer technology has left the law in the dust.").
173See Johnson, supra note 65, at 66-72 (providing a review of regulations of traditional
mass media of broadcast media, cable T.V. and common carriers, noting, "...the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998

41

Akron Law Review, Vol. 31 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 3

pervasiveness of the medium into the home where children may be present, as well as its
concurrent accessibility, have been the pivotal factors courts have used to distinguish
broadcast from other mass communications media.") Id. at 66-67.
174See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
("Communications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on
one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by accident.'")(quoting
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
175See ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 845 ("[T]he receipt of information on the Internet requires
a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A
child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and
thereby to use the Internet unattended.").
176Johnson, supra note 65, at 93-94 (discussing the non-intrusive nature of the Internet
and that its audience has the ability to choose to avoid objectional speech, "Interactive
and online information services do not intrude upon the sanctity of an unwilling viewers
home."). See also Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control:
Renewing the Democratic Hear of the First Amendment in an Age of Interactive Media,
104 YALE L.J. 1619 (1995) (generally discussing how the lack of user control has
provided the justification for regulations of the the traditional mass media fields and that
the availability of control mechanisms may make similar regulations in cyberspace
unconstitutional).
177 See infra notes 178 & 180.
178Beyond certain"blocking" software that is available, Miscrosoft has backed the idea
of instituting a worldwide ratings system for online information, enabling parents and
teachers to screen out violence and offensive material. See Peter Lewis, Microsoft Backs
Ratings System for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at D1. Microsoft has labeled
such a system as RSAC-I and would offer a blocking option to any site which does not
have the appropriate ratings. Id.
179See Shea v. Reno ex rel. American Reporter, 930 F. Supp 916, 933-34 (S.D.N.Y
1996) (discussing the development of filtering software and other "blocking" mechanisms
which have been developed by the industry with the most major online service providers
allowing these control options free of charge to their customers).
180Id. at 932. The software is called Surfwatch. Id. Another popular screening/blocking
software is called Cyber Patrol. Id. They both maintain a list of sites determined by the
programmer to carry sexually explicit or indecent material and the user is then blocked
for obtaining access to those sites. Id.
181 See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) ("[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nuture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
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prepare him for additional obligations."). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)
stating:
Our Jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family
as a unit with broad parental authority over minor childrenn . . . the law's concept of the
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
importantly, historically it has been recognized that natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id. at 602.
182 See Sable Communications of Calf., FNC. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Bolger v.
Yongs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957)
(each case holding the respective legislation in question with its airm or goal of
protecting children could not take precedence over protected First Amendment rights).
183Shea, 930 F. Supp at 932. Describing other attempts the computer industry has taken
including the World Wide Web Consortium which "launched the Platform for Internet
Content ("PICS") to develop technical standards for attaching electronic ratings to
Internet addresses." Id. This will include browsers, news group readers, and mail readers.
Id. Thus, the computer user could readily identify what type of site their computer has
accessing and block any one that is found undesirable.
184See Johnson, supra note 65, at 97-98 (quoting a statement by Civil Libertarian Mike
Godwin, the staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
185See Knoll, supra note 3, at 278-300 (outlining the development of self-regulation on
the Net and how the U.S and other countries are attempting to develop workable
regulations).
186Knoll, supra note 3, at n.17 (explaining how inappropriate behavior is governed on
the Net. If enough people find the behavior offense or indecent, they may retaliate by
sending messages to the offender. If enough people respond and flood the offender's
mailbox, this can shut that site down completely) (quoting G. Gurgess Allison, THE
LAWYERS GUIDE TO THE INTERNET at 338 (1995)).
187Mr. Bungle was a pseudonym a user utilized in interacting online. See generally,
Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cybersapce or How an Evil Clown, A Haitian Trickster Spirit,
Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society, 1994, ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 471 (1994) (throughly discussing the Mr. Bungle incident in detail and
how it was resolved by the members of the particular virtual community).
188Id. at 471.
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189Id. at. 473-74. (describing a MUD as a type of virtual reality, a database designed to
provide user the sense of being present in a physical space).
190Id. at 471-74 (detailing the actions of Mr. Bungle in the virtual community of 1500
members).
191Dibbell, supra note 187, at 477-78 (describing a toading as the equivalnt to a "death
warrant" in the virtual cyber communtiy).
192Id.
193The Communications and Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, restricted certain indecent
communications over computer networks. The CDA was recently struck down by the
Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct 2329 (1992). The Court held key provisions
of the CDA were overbroad and vague as the statute would effectively keep "indecent"
material from adults who have a right to see such material. Id. at 2331-32.
19447 U.S.C. §§ 223 a-233h (1997 electionic update). The CDA is really only part of the
larger Telecommunications Act of 1996, which amended the Telecommunications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C § 201 et. seq. Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exons
Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway,
49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 92 (1996).
195See Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2384 (1996) ("The history of this Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence . . . is one of continual development . . . the
Constitution's general command . . . has been applied to new circumstances requiring
different adaptations of prior principles and precedents.").
196See Gara Lamarche, International Free Expression Principles in Cyberspace, 17
WHITTIER L. REV. 279 (1995) ("Every new developing technology brings challenges
and opportunities which frighten people with power, and empower people without power.
That was true of the printing press. It was true of the telegraph. It was true of the
telephone, the radio, television, and now it is true of cyberspace.").
197See supra part IV.
198See supra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
199See supra notes 2 and 4.
200See Van Valkenburg, supra note 101, at 329 (paraphrasing Justice Holmes) (quoting
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 ( Boston, Little Brown
1881)). See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) stating:
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[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market....
Id.
201McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995).
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